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Abstract
Ever since the U.S.’ 2003 invasion, Iraq’s legal system has been mired by corruption,
sectarianism, and deceit. In an effort to allay the negative effects of these things, each iteration of
the Iraqi government since 2003 has doubled down on efforts to appear legitimate within the
eyes of the public. Government-funded propaganda, secret police, intense censorship, and even
campaigns of torture and kidnapping by security forces are just some of the ways in which the
government has sought to gain legitimacy. Perhaps understandably, these same efforts have often
wound up alienating and upsetting the citizenry further. This thesis analyzes the myriad of ways
in which the government’s quest for acceptance by its citizens has shaped the country into what
it is today—and has informed the ongoing public protests.
In order to accurately assess the present state of the government, a close examination of
quantitative and qualitative data available is needed. Using data sets provided by the REACH
Initiative (2018) and the UN (2016), it becomes clear that a very pressing disparity exists
between what Iraqi citizens believe will rectify their country and what the government believes it
must do. A significant proportion of the Iraqis who have survived the ongoing violence feel
strongly about the lack of public services. Rebuilding the country should involve allocating
significant funding towards reconstructing basic public infrastructure and working to end the IDP
crisis. Nevertheless, the government in post-Daesh Iraq rarely operates this way. Informed by
previous iterations of quasi-authoritarian regimes, the government has instead focused its efforts
on performative security measures. Trials for suspected Daesh members rarely last longer than a
matter of minutes, often with little to no evidence presented (i.e. an anonymous allegation made
by someone with ulterior motives, or a forced confession beaten out of a suspect by the Iraqi
Security Forces), and all who come before a judge are sentenced to death. Many of those who are
on death row must appear on "In the Grip of the Law," a state-sponsored television program
which further dehumanizes them. This disparity in funding—and the abusive treatment of both
detainees and anti-corruption protestors alike—has become one of the most prominent causes
which citizens today have taken to rallying against. In my thesis, I bring forward questions of
corruption and sectarianism in relation to the rule of law and sovereignty.
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Introduction
Dilapidated infrastructure, corrupt government officials, and over 500,000 internally
displaced persons1 are just some of the issues facing modern-day Iraq. After the Islamic State of
Iraq and Syria (Daesh) was successfully beaten back by Iraqi forces – and its self-declared
caliphate all but lost – the nation has been in a state of disarray as it seeks to compensate for all it
has lost. One of the most insidious problems plaguing contemporary Iraqi society, however,
largely remains unaddressed; its effects are not as outwardly visible as some of the aforesaid
problems are, so it has received relatively little attention or care. The issue at hand is that of the
Iraqi criminal justice system. The criminal justice system in Iraq has a longstanding history
riddled with abuses of power at every level 2, and yet there is an argument to be made that its
operation in the contemporary era is far worse than its previous iterations. Countless people have
been arrested under suspicion of collaborating with Daesh, yet the evidence against the
individuals in question is oftentimes nebulous at best. All it takes to be arrested for a crime,
citizens allege, is for two people to accuse an individual of serving as a collaborator under
Daesh’s regime.3 This process is unfair, they claim, because it enables a process wherein people
report those they dislike – or those with whom they share a fraught history have a history of
fighting with – for no reason other than spite. Detainees then wait, imprisoned for indeterminate

“Humanitarian Community Appeals for US$701 Million to Reach 1.75 Million Iraqis with
Assistance [EN/AR] - Iraq.” ReliefWeb. UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian
Affairs, April 29, 2019. https://reliefweb.int/report/iraq/humanitarian-community-appeals-us701million-reach-175-million-iraqis-assistance-enar.
2 Makiya, Kanan. Republic of Fear: The Politics of Modern Iraq, Updated Edition. University of
California Press, 1998.
3 Taub, Ben. “Iraq's Post-ISIS Campaign of Revenge.” The New Yorker. The New Yorker, July
9, 2019. https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/12/24/iraqs-post-isis-campaign-of-revenge.
1
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amounts of time (and oftentimes tortured by members of Iraqi security forces), until their day in
court.4 Upon entering the courtroom, the treatment of the accused is not much better.
In order to accurately assess the state of the criminal justice system in post-Daesh Iraq, a
multi-tiered investigation utilizing both qualitative and quantitative methods must be conducted.
Chapter Two of this thesis will be a review of the nation’s legal and political history, as well as
that of its criminal justice system, from 2003 to the present. After the United States’ 2003
invasion of Iraq, the Coalition Provisional Authority (led by U.S. officials) took control and
appointed an Interim Governing Council.5 It was under the leadership of this council, however,
that political hardliners became more prominent than before.6 The conservative right, for
instance, passed Resolution 137 in late 2003, an act that repealed women’s protections in family
law and modeled the new legal system based on a stringent interpretation of Sharia.7 Iraqi
women protested for over a year until it was repealed in December 2004 8 – and thus, the
longstanding protest culture was established within the “rebirth” of the nation in the deBaathification era.
While the existing scholarly literature often covers public opinion of criminal justice
practices,9 and whether or not certain laws regarding criminal procedure are actually put into

ibid
5 “Q&A: Whos Who on Iraqs Governing Council.” Council on Foreign Relations. The New York
Times, July 17, 2003.
https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/cfr/international/slot2_071703.html?_r=1.
6 “Iraq: Women's Rights in Family Law.” . النساء اللواتي يعشن في ظل قوانين اسالميهWomen Living
Under Muslim Laws. http://www.wluml.org/action/iraq-protect-iraqi-womens-rights-familylaws.
7 ibid.
8 “. ”إلغاء قانون األحوال الشخصية في العراقAl Jazeera, October 3, 2004.
https://www.aljazeera.net/programs/forwomenalone/2004/10/3/العراق-في-الشخصية-األحوال-قانون-إلغاء.
9 Kao, Kristen, and Mara Revkin. “To Punish or to Pardon? Reintegrating Rebel Collaborators
After Conflict in Iraq.” SSRN, June 24, 2018.
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3201354.
4
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practice10, it neglects other important dimensions of the criminal justice system. Some such
dimensions include why and how the Criminal Procedure Code was established, the problems
that have come with ensuring criminal procedure is stringently followed, and what happens to
the overall population when it feels betrayed by its own government. The first of these speaks to
the sense of idealism that has persisted in Iraq in spite of the odds. A free and fair system in
which accountability and justice are equally prized has always been at the heart of the nation’s
codified law. The issue, however, has come in the actualization of those noble goals. As
previously stated, prior regimes have “gotten away with murder,” so to speak, and the leftover
vestiges of governmental corruption remain to this day. This has led to an oft-antagonistic
relationship (or, at best, an indifferent coexistence) between the government and the very citizens
it was chosen to represent. As a result, the population has developed a complex relationship with
its political leaders: one riddled in mutual mistrust and doubt.
Chapter Three will detail the post-Daesh criminal justice system, and all of the
complexities that exist therein. The vast majority of trials within the nation, for instance, last less
than ten minutes.11 Detainees will often plead with the judge; explain that they had nothing to do
with the crimes they have been accused of; tell stories of how Daesh ruined their lives long ago,
and insist upon their innocence; and point out that the state has no direct evidence linking them
to any sort of criminal offense or association.12 Judges simply point to forced confessions the
accused signed while in prison – documents that, all too frequently, were blank pieces of paper

“Iraq Post-Daesh: Improved Social Cohesion, but Iraqis Remain Dissatisfied with
Government.” National Survey Findings. National Democratic Institute, July 2019.
https://www.ndi.org/sites/default/files/NDI Iraq Survey 2019_EN_0.pdf.
11 “How It Ends: Judgment.” NPR. NPR, April 11, 2019.
https://www.npr.org/templates/transcript/transcript.php?storyId=712409472
12 ibid
10
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during the window of time that the accused were violently coerced by security forces into putting
their thumbprints on it13 – and all of the defense’s arguments fall upon deaf ears. The accused
also do not often get to feel the support of loved ones on their day in court, because family and
friends are too worried that they might be arrested and accused of committing heinous acts
simply by their association with the accused. Some, on the night before they are supposed to die,
are selected to go on the reality television show In the Grip of the Law.14 The program, which
parades death row inmates in front of the camera to confess their guilt and agree that they
deserve capital punishment, has over ten million viewers each week.15 The performative nature
of this television show, in addition to the nation’s substandard practices with regards to the
criminal justice system, deserves to be the subject of heavy scrutiny. I will also explore the
ramifications regarding national security, hyper-sectarianism, the legal system, and semiautonomous regions that these facets of the current criminal justice system engender in this
chapter.
Chapter Four will explore the current protests taking place in Iraq. With the crises caused
by Daesh finally coming to a close, and citizens looking instead to what they want out of the
future of their nation, efforts and attention have since been refocused on rebuilding and
reforming the nation. Civilians have taken to the streets to call for an end to chronic
unemployment, governmental corruption, and lacking public services 16, impassioned to change
their quality of life for the better. I will first explore how these protests came to be, analyzing

Taub, Ben. “Iraq’s Post-ISIS Campaign.”
 في قبضهAl-Iraqiya. Al-Iraqiya, 2019.
15 France-Presse, Agence. “Iraq TV Show Broadcasts 'Confessions' of Death-Row Extremists.”
The National. The National, February 6, 2018. https://www.thenational.ae/world/mena/iraq-tvshow-broadcasts-confessions-of-death-row-extremists-1.702183.
16 ibid
13
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several published, data-driven surveys on how the Iraqi public has felt it relates to its government
over the years. By utilizing the nation’s political and legal history as the background through
which current events can best be understood, I seek to derive statistical trends from data gathered
in contemporary times. Once I have explored the escalation of protests by the Iraqi public, I will
then turn to the state’s reaction. Instead of an ongoing dialogue between protestors and security
officials, protestors’ pleas have been met by a brutal state crackdown. At the time of writing,
hundreds of peaceful protestors have died at the hands of security forces in the last month
alone.17 Although state crackdowns are far from abnormal within the nation (as will be explored
in Chapter Two), the current violence may very well engender future radicalization as well. That
would, in turn, perpetuate the ongoing injustices of the criminal justice system – and threaten the
very foundation of the nation once more.
Chapter Five will summarize and conclude my findings. Healing from mass atrocities
such as those committed by Daesh, and besieged at present by mass protests from a discontented
public, Iraq needs to build itself up again. If the population of a nation that has already endured
mass trauma continues to have an antagonistic relationship with its government and security
forces, it is clear reform must occur. In order for successful reform to take place, however, the
factors most influencing the system in question must be addressed and considered. Nothing can
develop in a vacuum. Plenty of possible solutions for the crisis may exist, but one thing is
certain: because the government of Iraq has always lacked legitimacy in the eyes of its citizens,
the path forward will likely favor a more decentralized approach to governing than ever before.

Iraq Protests: Security Forces Open Fire on Protesters.” BBC News. British Broadcasting
Corporation, November 24, 2019. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-50536334.
17
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Chapter Two
The Beginning of the Timeline: 2003-2005
In deciding to “fix” Iraq in 2003, the United States has instead perpetuated the delegitimization of Iraqi governments and opened the nation up to decades of instability. After the
2003 invasion of Iraq, the U.S. instilled and supported the Coalitional Provisional Authority.
1

The CPA appointed an Interim Governing Council (“the Council”) not long thereafter.

While the Council did succeed in signing a very liberal constitution into law – indeed, dubbed by
some as “one of the most liberal constitutions ever to have been drafted” 2 – the Council still
faced significant opposition. While the document did grant universal suffrage, and established
the framework for a path towards semi-autonomy for Kurdistan, hypersectarianism stilled ruled
the day. The U.S.’ decision to appoint Iraqi National Accord’s Iyad Allawi, a man formerly in
exile with close connections to the White House, as the nation’s prime minister raised eyebrows. 3
It was easy for citizens to pick up on the common thread between most of the Council’s
appointees of choice: close connections to, and/or implicit support of, the United States
government and the CIA. Thus, despite the apparent liberalness of the nation’s newly minted
constitution, citizens were left with no choice but to submit to the rule of the U.S.-backed
appointees. The Council dissolved on June 28, 2004 4, and Allawi began his reign as prime

1“Q&A:

Whos Who on Iraqs Governing Council.” Council on Foreign Relations. The New York
Times, July 17, 2003. www.nytimes.com/cfr/international/slot2_071703.html?_r=1.
2 "Grand sentiments, and an uncomfortable compromise: governing council signs interim
constitution for Iraq." MEED Middle East Economic Digest, March 12, 2004. https://link-galecom.libproxy.union.edu/apps/doc/A114924753/AONE?u=nysl_ca_unionc&sid=AONE&xid=a9
99814a
3 "Controversy greets new government: fresh violence greets cabinet announcement." MEED
Middle East Economic Digest, June 4, 2004. https://link-galecom.libproxy.union.edu/apps/doc/A118495594/AONE?u=nysl_ca_unionc&sid=AONE&xid=b2
194ea9.
4 Ibid.
8

minister on that day. Within one month, any hope the citizens might have felt for a liberal, nonviolent governing force was eradicated. Allawi’s July 2004 decision to create the General
Security Directorate not only concerned and frightened Iraqis, but also inspired the ire of rebel
militants throughout the nation.5 Using the General Security Directorate as an iron fist, Allawi
instated a mandatory curfew for Iraqi citizens. He encouraged members of the General Security
Directorate – some of whom, in fact, were members of the security forces of Saddam Hussein 6 –
to engage in surprise searches of citizens’ homes. The ever-present threat of martial law hung in
the air, and citizens lived in fear of random detainment on suspicion of sympathizing with militia
groups. Troubling allegations also began to surface about Allawi’s personal conduct. In a piece
that would go on to win several awards, the Sydney Morning Herald released information about
a visit Allawi had conducted to a police station in Baghdad. Speaking on the condition of
anonymity, several witnesses alleged that Allawi’s primary purpose of visiting was to show his
security forces how he wanted them to “handle” those accused of collaborating with militant
Islamist organizations.7 Allawi reportedly shot each member of a group of six suspected militants
in the head, in front of a crowd of Iraqi and American personnel. Those that were there claim he
offered a solemn message upon the slaughter’s conclusion: “…we must destroy anyone who
wants to destroy Iraq and kill our people.”8

"Allawi pledges crackdown on insurgency." MEED Middle East Economic Digest, July 16,
2004. https://link-galecom.libproxy.union.edu/apps/doc/A120102970/AONE?u=nysl_ca_unionc&sid=AONE&xid=dd
d434bf
6 Ibid.
7 “Allawi Shot Prisoners in Cold Blood: Witnesses.” The Sydney Morning Herald. The Sydney
Morning Herald, July 17, 2004. https://www.smh.com.au/world/middle-east/allawi-shotprisoners-in-cold-blood-witnesses-20040717-gdjd6k.html
8 Ibid.
5
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In August 2004, just one month after the creation of Allawi’s General Security
Directorate, Allawi’s administration created another regulatory commission designed to restrict
civilians’ access to the media.9 Overseen by former Baathist Ibrahim Janabi, the Higher Media
Council was designed to serve as an arm of the government through which media containing
harmful or sensitive information could be censored from reaching the masses. Allawi
condemned, for instance, depictions of Americans celebrating the deaths of Iraqis on
international news channels. In a public speech of Allawi’s, he argued passionately against airing
stories on the news that would further traumatize and upset the already-aggrieved population.10
The Higher Media Council’s mission soon morphed, however, from the prevention of
widespread re-traumatization into the government’s unofficial propaganda arm.11 The
government sought to censor anything it deemed subversive content, including any and all
criticisms of the administration’s leaders. Citizens were particularly vocal in their disgust after
the Higher Media Council ordered Al Jazeera offices in Iraq to close down.12 Instead of engaging
in a dialogue with citizens about the matter, however, the government only doubled down on its

Berkowitz, Bill. “Iraq's Prime Minister Suppresses Media.” Working for Change. Working
Assets, August 12, 2004.
https://web.archive.org/web/20061110034931/http://www.workingforchange.com/article.cfm?Ite
mID=17458.
10 Price, Monroe. “Allawi's Higher Media Council : Reimposing Controls on the Iraqi Press.”
The New York Times. The New York Times, October 9, 2004.
https://www.nytimes.com/2004/10/09/opinion/allawis-higher-media-council-reimposingcontrols-on-the-iraqi-press.html.
11 Ibid.
12 Harding, Luke. “Iraq Extends al-Jazeera Ban and Raids Offices.” The Guardian, September 6,
2004. https://www.theguardian.com/media/2004/sep/06/iraq.broadcasting.
9
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stance. Television stations were often warned that they too would be at risk of receiving the same
treatment if they aired material criticizing Allawi. 13
With the regulatory committee keeping such a close eye on news media sources, the
nation’s sociopolitical climate grew more and more polarized. From 2003 to 2005, factions of the
conservative right fought to have their demands on society legally codified. Indeed, some of
those factions were propelled into prominence on a national scale for their creation and support
of Resolution 137 in 2003.14 The aforesaid resolution called for the complete and total repeal of
the legal rights and protections afforded to women in family law, replacing them instead with a
stringent interpretation of Sharia. 15 Male clerics would appoint themselves to decide cases in
family law, and all decisions reached would be final. Although Resolution 137 was never
formally signed into law due to widespread protests by Iraqi women, the fact that it was reported
to have been passed in a matter of minutes proved troubling for the governing authorities.
Religious and political hardliners continued campaigning for a reversion back to tradition in the
years that followed. They gained purchase as the Allawi administration continued its
crackdowns; citizens, frustrated with the “liberal” government, often found solace within
hardline ethnosectarian movements
Some of these groups utilized extralegal methods in their attempts to bring about
dramatic sociopolitical change; Ansar al-Islam, for instance, was a militant Salafist organization
that attracted predominantly Kurdish Sunnis who protested vehemently against American

Berkowitz, Bill. “Iraq's Prime Minister Suppresses Media.” Working Assets, August 12, 2004.
https://web.archive.org/web/20061110034931/http://www.workingforchange.com/article.cfm?Ite
mID=17458.
14 “Iraq: Women's Rights in Family Law.” . النساء اللواتي يعشن في ظل قوانين اسالميهWomen Living
Under Muslim Laws. http://www.wluml.org/action/iraq-protect-iraqi-womens-rights-familylaws.
15 Ibid.
13
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occupation and the federalist system of government.16 Ansar al-Islam assured Kurds that what
was “wrong” with the government was its decision to break from tradition – the federal
government served as a puppet for U.S. interests, they insisted, and the fledgling Kurdish
Regional Government was far too secular.17 Ansar al-Islam encouraged its members to fight
coalition forces in order to actualize the changes they wished to see. Members were subsequently
responsible for a series of bombings in the nation – from the Erbil bombings of 2004, which
killed over 100 Iraqis 18, to the 2005 bombing of a bank in Kirkuk where government officials
were waiting to pick up their paychecks. 19 Other civilians gravitated towards groups like Al
Qaeda of Iraq (“AQI”), which propagated a vision of a theocratic nation governed by Sunni
nationalists.20 Under the leadership of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, AQI launched a series of attacks
on secular Iraqis and Shi’a Muslims from 2003 on. They were, for instance, responsible for the
February 2004 bombing of the Kadhimiya Shrine in Baghdad, which killed around 200 Muslims
and injured at least 500 more.21 The violence perpetrated by these and other militant groups – as
well as the violence perpetrated by Allawi’s government – inspired some members the citizenry
of Iraq to act similarly. In March 2004, citizens unaffiliated with militant Salafist organizations

“Mapping Militants: Ansar Al-Islam.” Stanford Center for International Security and
Cooperation. Stanford University Press.
https://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/mappingmilitants/profiles/ansar-al-islam#text_block_12174.
17 “Ansar Al-Islam.” Global Terrorism Database, April 21, 2014.
https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=20055.
18 Gregory, Kathryn. “Ansar al-Islam (Iraq, Islamists/Kurdish Separatists), Ansar al-Sunnah.”
The Council on Foreign Relations, November 5, 2008.
19 “Ansar Al-Islam.” Global Terrorism Database, April 21, 2014.
https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=20055.
20 Whitaker, Brian. “Revealed: Al-Qaida Plan to Seize Control of Iraq.” The Guardian. The
Guardian, October 12, 2005. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2005/oct/13/alqaida.iraq.
21 Burns, John F., and Jeffrey Gettleman. “Blasts at Shiite Ceremonies in Iraq Kill More Than
140.” The New York Times. The New York Times, March 2, 2004.
https://www.nytimes.com/2004/03/02/international/middleeast/blasts-at-shiite-ceremonies-iniraq-kill-more-than.html?_r=0.
16
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murdered and desecrated the bodies of four American contractors in Falluja. 22 Locals who did
not directly carry out the attack were nevertheless in support of it taking place, tired of U.S.
interventionism and the government Americans had created. 23 The bloodbath on all sides – from
the government cracking down on civilians, to the rise of militant Salafist organizations, to the
anger and violence of Iraqi civilians – essentially epitomize Allawi’s rule. The interim
government primarily relied on force to establish its legitimacy, and the nation’s population
responded back in kind to establish that it felt neither loyalty nor love for its new government.
Redefining a Nation: Challenges, Triumphs, and Loose Ends
When the January 2005 elections finally took place, a new order was ushered in. These
elections were not only responsible for instilling a National Assembly, but also for governorates
throughout Iraq, as well as the Kurdish parliament. 24 Each voter was to cast a ballot, voting for
only 1 of 111 possible electoral slates. Each slate would then gain seats in the National Assembly
based on the number of votes they received – a directly proportional system of governance. The
main coalitions vying for power were the Watani List, a Shi’a Islamist coalition backed by
prominent religious figure Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani25; the Democratic Patriotic Alliance of
Kurdistan, an Kurdish nationalist coalition comprised of the Kurdish Democratic Party and the

Gettleman, Jeffrey. “Enraged Mob in Falluja Kills 4 American Contractors.” The New York
Times. The New York Times, March 31, 2004.
https://www.nytimes.com/2004/03/31/international/worldspecial/enraged-mob-in-falluja-kills-4american.html.
23 ibid
24 Perry, Cal. “Milestone Elections Begin in Iraq.” CNN. Cable News Network, January 30,
2005. https://www.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/meast/01/29/iraq.main/.
25 Hamida, Iyad. “ ”السيستاني الرقم الصعب في المعادلة العراقيةDW.COM. January 21, 2005.
https://www.dw.com/ar/العراقية-المعادلة-في-الصعب-الرقم-السيستاني/a-1465722.
22
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Patriotic Union of Kurdistan 26; and the Iraqi List, a small coalition of secular Shi’a Muslims led
by Allawi.27 Many Sunni Arabs felt as though their interests were not being represented by any
of these groups, and the threats of violence against Sunni voters by militant Shi’a groups made
matters worse.28 As such, a great number of Sunnis boycotted the elections altogether. The
Watani List wound up garnering 48% of the overall vote, winning them 140 seats in the National
Assembly.29 The Democratic Patriotic Alliance of Kurdistan followed suit with 25% of the vote,
winning them 75 seats in the National Assembly. 30 The Iraqi List won just 13% of the vote, and
was awarded 40 seats. 31 All other parties running each received less than 2% of the vote, many
of which didn’t win any seats in the Assembly. Thus, Shi’a Muslims and Kurds were set to
dominate the government on a national scale. The National Assembly henceforth appointed Jalal
Talabani, a Kurdish leader, President; Adel Abdul Mehdi, a Shi’a Arab, Vice President; Ghazi
al-Yawar, a Sunni Arab, Vice President; and Ibrahim al-Jaafari, a Shi’a Arab, Prime Minister 32.
This control proved invaluable when it came time to draft the nation’s constitution in
October – the first constitution in which U.S. interventionism would not heavily influence its
contents. Because the majority of elected officials were political Islamists, they sought to

Abbas, Mushreq. “Iraqi Provincial Law Renews Debate Over Centralization.” Al Monitor, July
8, 2013. https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/07/iraq-province-law-statedecentralization.html
27 “Political Parties in Iraq.” Iraq Foundation for Development Research, 2005.
http://www.irfad.org/political-parties-of-iraq/
28 Wong, Edward. “Sunnis Reject Really Election Results, Calling for Inquiry.” The New York
Times. The New York Times, December 21, 2005.
https://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/21/world/middleeast/sunnis-reject-early-iraq-election-resultscalling-for.html
29 “Elections in 2005.” Independent Electoral Commission of Iraq, 2005.
http://archive.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/arc/2151bis_05.htm
30 Ibid.
31 Ibid.
32 Ibid.
26
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combine the values of their religion with the principles of democracy. As stated in the
Constitution, “Islam is the official religion of the state and is a foundation source of legislation:
no law may be enacted that contradicts the established provisions of Islam; no law may be
enacted that contradicts the principles of democracy; [and] no law may be enacted that
contradicts the rights and basic freedoms stipulated in this Constitution.” 33 The Constitution also
enshrines rights for women, religious and ethnic minorities, the elderly, and children. While the
document is unabashedly progressive in its entirety, Sunni opponents took offense to the
Constitution’s proposition of a weak federal government.34 While their opposition did not change
the system of government, an amendment process was added to the constitution so that the
matter could be revisited later if the demand was strong enough.35 With the Constitution
established as the basis for government – and its contents describing in detail what the federal
government and its branches would look like – Iraqi politicians turned their attention towards
implementing the rule of law they had established.
Stabilizing the country would prove more to be difficult than originally thought;
insurgency groups planned frequent attacks in the hopes of destabilizing the country’s fledgling
government. Insurgents threatened violence against civilians and the government alike almost
every day.36 In fact, the “calmest” month of 2005 was August, which only saw four high-impact

“Iraq’s Constitution of 2005.” Constitute Project.
https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Iraq_2005.pdf?lang=en
34 Beehner, Lionel. “Why Sunnis Don’t Support Iraq’s Constitution.” Council on Foreign
Relations, October 12, 2005. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/why-sunnis-dont-support-iraqsconstitution
35 Ibid.
36 De Albuquerque, Adriana, & Michael O’Hanlon. “Iraq Index: Tracking Variables of
Reconstruction & Security in Post-Saddam Iraq.” Brookings Institution, March 18, 2005.
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/index20050318.pdf
33
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terrorist attacks and one large-scale stampede that killed almost one thousand Iraqis. 37 Car bombs
and IEDs scattered throughout the capital killed security personnel every month.38 The conflict
only grew worse and worse as the months wore on, growing especially heated around times of
major political change. On October 13, the government announced a four-day curfew for the
express purpose of limiting attacks from insurgency groups.39 The government also doubled
down on security during the elections. Police forces lined the streets, and security was especially
vigilant around polling centers. A tragedy still occurred that evening – an IED took the lives of
five Iraqis and two Americans 40 – but it was the only one of its kind. Violence ramped up once
more after the curfew ended, only quelling once more around the December 2005 elections for a
permanent, four-year government.41
The results of the December 2005 elections are similar to those of its predecessor, with
one key difference: the rise of Sunni opposition. Sunnis, galvanized by the lack of participation
and representation they’d felt with the interim National Assembly, showed up to the polls in
record numbers.42 Several insurgency groups had even put a moratorium on attacks during the
elections, sending out their own soldiers to serve as security against other groups trying to
intimidate voters (like the foreign insurgents of Al Qaeda of Iraq). 43 Their efforts proved
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successful. The Watani List and the Democratic Patriotic Alliance of Kurdistan still held 41.2%
and 21.7% of the vote, respectively 44, but the third-most powerful party in all of Iraq was the
newly-formed Tawafuq party – a Sunni coalition comprised of the Iraqi National Dialogue
Council, the General Council for the People of Iraq, and the Iraqi Islamic Party – with 15% of
the vote.45 These results would mean that the Shiite Watani List no longer had the two-thirds
majority that they needed to form a government. Instead, they would have to reach a consensus
with their Sunni and secular counterparts in order to rule effectively. The first assertion the
Watani List had to adhere to was the replacement of Ibrahim al-Jaafari as Prime Minister.46 AlJaafari was seen by these groups as incompetent, unable to handle the steady stream of violence
that insurgency groups meted out under his rule. Many felt he and his administration were
complicit in the bouts of sectarian violence. Al-Jaafari was officially removed from his position
in April 2006.47 The Sunnis, Kurds, and secularists accepted Nouri al-Maliki as Prime Minister,
and al-Maliki came into power shortly thereafter. 48

“Country Profile: Iraq.” The Federal Research Division of the United States Library of
Congress, August 2006.
https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=6&ved=2ahUKEwiz1ey
Sm5PnAhXoYt8KHSdBDR0QFjAFegQIBhAB&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.loc.gov%2Frr%2
Ffrd%2Fcs%2Fprofiles%2FWord%2FIraqnew.doc&usg=AOvVaw3tRAJPSl08QWQKC4wFGsCn
45 “Council of Representatives of Iraq.” The Inter-Parliamentary Union & the Independent
Electoral Commission of Iraq, December 2005.
https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=6&ved=2ahUKEwiz1ey
Sm5PnAhXoYt8KHSdBDR0QFjAFegQIBhAB&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.loc.gov%2Frr%2
Ffrd%2Fcs%2Fprofiles%2FWord%2FIraqnew.doc&usg=AOvVaw3tRAJPSl08QWQKC4wFGsCn
46 “Fact Sheet: Ibrahim al-Jaafari.” The Institute for the Study of War, May 12, 2010.
http://www.understandingwar.org/reference/fact-sheet-ibrahim-al-jaafari
47 Ibid.
48 Ignatius, David. “In Iraq’s Choice, a Chance for Unity.” The Washington Post, The
Washington Post, April 26, 2006. https://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2006/04/25/AR2006042501650.html
44

17

Al-Maliki presented his first choices for cabinet on May 20, 2006 and won approval the same
day.49 Once in office, al-Maliki asserted that it was one of the utmost priorities of his office to
impede and eradicate insurgency groups from the nation. He often spoke out against the
prominence of insurgencies in Iraq, making it known that, “those who disrupt the course of
life… will have a tragic end. 50” Al-Maliki proved his rhetoric wasn’t simply ideological just one
month later, when he partnered with the U.S. government to bring about the death of Abu Musab
al-Zarqawi.51 Al-Zarqawi, leader of Al Qaeda of Iraq (“AQI”), had been responsible for several
large-scale bombings and countless other attacks throughout the nation. 52 He was regarded as a
fearsome leader through whom militant Salafist jihadists could actualize their dreams of a
territorial caliphate. Al-Zarqawi was often considered more ambitious than Al Qaeda’s Osama
bin Laden in his goals.53 His drive for immediate change led to deviations in ideology and
strategy from the rest of Al Qaeda that resulted in AQI’s eventual split from its parent
organization (and its subsequent transformation into the organization known as Daesh). AlZarqawi died in a raid at the hands of al-Maliki and the U.S. government – as did his immediate
successor, Abu Hamza al-Muhajir54 – but the radical, urgent form of militant Salafi jihadism
which he pioneered lived on. Al-Maliki accordingly spent a great deal of his two terms in office
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combatting against AQI soldiers. Most of the raids conducted throughout al-Maliki’s first term
were victories attributed primarily to the U.S.55, but as al-Maliki’s government gained more
power, the administration started taking the lead on attacks against insurgencies.
Radical insurgency groups weren’t the only thing al-Maliki spent a great deal of his terms in
office fighting against, however. Al-Maliki was also frequently accused of targeting the press in
Iraq through the use of censorship and imprisonment. The International Committee to Protect
Journalists had written to him in June 2006, asking him to reverse the pattern of restricted press
and journalist intimidation that leaders before him had started. 56 Rather than heed their pleas, alMaliki almost immediately began censoring Iraqi press. In the first few years of his governance,
al-Maliki started by censoring content that he felt would be demoralizing to Iraqi citizens (i.e.
bloodshed between Iraqis, as well as sectarian conflict). 57 The government took pains to limit all
media showcasing – or even hinting – at violent or sexual content. 58 Al-Maliki then censored all
media discussing “‘drugs, terrorism, gambling, negative remarks about Islam, and
pornography.’”59 The al-Maliki administration proceeded to force Internet cafes to register with
the government, lest they close their doors permanently. 60 A significant proportion of the airtime
on Iraqi television was dedicated towards praising (or reporting strictly positive stories on) the
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al-Maliki regime. Critics of the administration asserted that al-Maliki’s government was
beginning to resemble Saddam Hussein’s with regards to its systematic targeting of members of
the press.
Allegations of quasi-authoritarianism were only further exacerbated by the administration’s
other policies. Al-Maliki’s decision, for instance, to fire officials whose positions were explicitly
created to fight corruption in the government raised the public’s suspicions. 61 His creation of two
military forces that reported to him directly62, (as well as the re-politicization of the Iraqi
Security Forces 63), also inspired concerns amongst critics of the government. His decision to
create his own chain of command that superseded the already-existing non-hypersectarian chain
of command suggested that he was not afraid to weaponize the military against citizens if need
be. When the 2010 elections started looming closer, the administration decided to ban nine
political parties and over four hundred and fifty candidates from running for office under the
guise of de-Baathification.64 Most of those banned from running were secular, liberal, and/or
Sunni candidates. No officials in al-Maliki’s party – and indeed, none of the theocraticallyinclined Shi’a parties – suffered as a result of the ban.65 Because of al-Maliki’s restrictions on the
election, a new coalition was created: the al-Iraqiya List, comprised of secular Shi’as and

Glanz, James, and Riyadh Mohammed. “Premier of Iraq is Quietly Firing Fraud Monitors.”
The New York Times. The New York Times, November 17, 2008.
https://web.archive.org/web/20150225103832/http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/18/world/middl
eeast/18maliki.html?=&_r=0
62 Yaphe, Judith. “Maliki’s Maneuvering in Iraq.” Foreign Policy Magazine, June 6, 2012.
https://foreignpolicy.com/2012/06/06/malikis-manuevering-in-iraq/
63 Pollack, Kenneth. “Iraq Military Situation Report.” The Brookings Institution, June 14, 2014.
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2014/06/14/iraq-military-situation-report/
64 Ottaway, Marina, and Danial Kaysi. “De-Baathification as a Political Tool: Commission
Ruling Bans Political Parties and Leaders.” The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,
January 26, 2010. https://carnegieendowment.org/2010/01/26/de-baathification-as-political-toolcommission-ruling-bans-political-parties-and-leaders-pub-24778
65 Ibid.
61

20

Sunnis.66 The al-Iraqiya List wound up taking 24.72% of the vote after the election, with alMaliki’s Dawlat al-Qānūn taking 24.22%.67 Despite the al-Maliki government’s attempts to stop
political opposition in its tracks, the al-Iraqiya List secured two more seats in parliament than the
Prime Minister’s own party. This decision, undoubtedly a blow to al-Maliki’s confidence,
showcased just how critical of the administration the public had become. Citizens had taken to
the polls in droves – often enduring barrages of violent attacks by militant Sunni insurgency
groups in the process 68 – all to make their disapproval known. Al-Maliki himself remained in
power despite all of this, however, because the National Assembly could not agree upon a
suitable replacement for Prime Minister. 69
From 2010 to 2014, al-Maliki continued ruling over Iraq. He made concessions and resisted
Arabization with regards to disputed territories like Khanaqin, doing what he could to ensure the
Kurdish bloc in government remained supportive of him.70 He became more of a despot as the
years went on, continuing all of the aforesaid policies and inventing new ones frequently. He
accused Vice President Tariq al-Hashemi of being the architect behind highly-covered terrorist
attacks – a move that cast extreme public scrutiny on al-Hashemi.71 The government quickly
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backed al-Maliki on all counts, and al-Maliki ordered al-Hashemi’s death not long after his
original allegations were made. 72 Al-Hashemi fled to Turkey at once. After fleeing the country,
al-Hashemi has since been quoted as saying that al-Maliki’s allegations were simply another
political move meant to secure and consolidate power for himself. One cannot poke many holes
in the seemingly incontrovertible evidence marking al-Hashemi as guilty, including damning
testimonies provided by his personal bodyguards and his son-in-law.73 Nevertheless, al-Maliki’s
motivations were likely not purely altruistic. Objective observers cannot deny that al-Maliki had
a great deal to gain upon al-Hashemi’s removal from power. Al-Hashemi was the Sunni leader of
the al-Iraqiya List, al-Maliki’s primary political opposition. Once al-Hashemi left the country,
his party effectively collapsed. With his Sunni counterparts so thoroughly fragmented, and Shi’a
Muslims rallying throughout the nation in shock and horror at the Sunni leader’s trial, al-Maliki
was indeed able to increase hypersectarianism in the nation and consolidate even more power for
himself.
The years of al-Maliki’s reign were ended by the 2014 electoral process. President Talabani
officially endorsed Haider al-Abadi for the position of prime minister instead of the incumbent
al-Maliki.74 Al-Maliki immediately took to the country’s news stations to “remind… them of his
position as head of the armed forces and assure soldiers that the ‘error’ will be rectified.75” alMaliki ultimately stepped down after facing widespread pressure from international world
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leaders about his attempt to remain in office 76, leaving al-Abadi with just thirty days to create an
entirely new government. Al-Abadi had little precedent to proceed on if he didn’t want his
government to derive its legitimacy solely from forcible consolidation of power. Cracking down
on citizens’ human rights; and instilling fear in the hearts of citizens, journalists, and political
opponents. Al-Haider also had to face this challenge while attempting to address the rise of
Daesh. In 2014, Daesh launched an offensive attack against the Yazidi community in Mount
Sinjar. It was an act of genocide. Thousands died, and hundreds more women and children were
sold into sexual slavery. This was only the beginning of Daesh’s hold on Iraq – the devastation
would only intensify in the years to come.
“Sent with a Sword as a Mercy”: Law Under Daesh
The physical establishment of the caliphate, as some have suggested, has turned Daesh
into what is known as a “hybrid terrorist organization,77” or an organization that combines the
methodology of a terrorist organization with the state-building enterprises and service provision
of more legitimate states. Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, leader of Daesh and self-proclaimed caliph,
created the quasi-governmental structure that would go on to dominate much of western Iraq and
Syria.78 Daesh declared its sovereign statehood shortly after conquering territory. Al-Baghdadi
created a highly centralized form of governance that he populated with former Baathists and
Iraqi military leaders.79 He gave complete control over policymaking to himself and the rest of
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the Shura Council – his top advisors and his likely successor.80 He created a Military Council to
station commanders and enforce order in each of the caliphate’s provinces.81 Finally, he created
the Security and Intelligence Council, spearheaded primarily by former Baathist agents. 82 AlBaghdadi also managed a successful psychological operations campaign against Iraqi security
forces at the time, striking fear into the hearts of soldiers and convincing many of them to
abandon their posts without fighting Daesh forces. 83 By capitalizing on the weakness of Iraqi
statehood, especially in the midst of national elections, al-Baghdadi had run several successful
military campaigns and captured more and more land.
From 2014 to 2017, Daesh usurped control of a significant amount of territory in both
Iraq and neighboring Syria. Included in this territorial expansion were several of Iraq’s most
prominent oil fields, including Ajil.84 Control over these fields provided the group with millions
of dollars’ worth of oil each year, although the actual amount of revenue generated was lessened
by the fact that Daesh could only smuggle and resell the oil into other nations at a heavy
discount.85 Daesh also made a significant amount of money in the excavation and sale of artifacts
from sites they demolished. “In one region of Syria alone,” reports on the group’s financial
transactions declared, “the group reportedly netted up to $36 million from activities that included
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the smuggling of plundered artifacts. 86 In an attempt to put a moratorium on the illicit sale of
artifacts, the International Council of Museums published a document in 2015 for law
enforcement officers and cultural ministers that detailed which cultural objects were most likely
at risk of being poached by Daesh. 87 Daesh was nonetheless able to smuggle and sell the
aforesaid objects. Another significant source of revenue for the organization was kidnappings for
ransom. In exchange for freeing just one group of Assyrian Christian hostages, Daesh was able
to make millions of dollars.88 As Daesh gained power and amassed land, authorities would also
be able to make money via taxation, extortion, human trafficking, and forced labor.89 All of
these funds weren’t simply added to al-Baghdadi’s personal wealth, however. He would utilize
the revenue gained to continue territorial expansion and to provide civil services for inhabitants
of the caliphate. Baghdadi had developed an elaborate system of municipal services that preDaesh lands had lacked, including motor vehicle departments, offices that issued legal
certificates, garbage collecting services, and electricity and clean water.90 Some Iraqis surveyed
have even been quoted as saying that, even amidst the cruelty and often unbearable
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authoritarianism of the regime, they were satisfied with the quality and availability of the public
services offered to them under the caliphate. 91
With its territory firmly established, Daesh decided to target international audiences to
amass even more followers. In its promotional magazine, Daesh informed followers that it “is at
war against Kafir states and anyone performing Hijrah [defined as a migration to Islamic lands,
in this case inferred to be the caliphate] should expect to perform Jihad [fighting in the name of
God].92” Through websites such as dawla-is.appspot.com, Daesh reached viewers in countries all
around the world. Dawla.IS in particular was “considered a documentary platform that provides
an archive of… speeches of the leaders, publications of Daesh media institutions, heroes
(martyrs) stories and profiles, episodes of videos, messages of the land of battles, and general
publications.93” Many active fighters were also available online to answer any questions,
comments or concerns that potential sympathizers might have. 94 In this manner, they were able
to establish personal rapports with viewers. Individual members of Daesh ran private accounts on
social media through which they interacted with thousands of followers, gave advice on
encrypting communications, and ‘live-tweeted’ accomplishments of Daesh.95 That Daesh seemed
to promote one single, unifying doctrine was a significant draw for people who have grown up in
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disordered lives and nations.96 Others performed Hijrah specifically with the intention of
marrying members of Daesh, enticed by the interactions they’d had with insurgents via encrypted
messaging platforms.97 More than anything else, most of the people travelling there desired a
sense of belonging and empowerment – of being understood and accepted by people who seemed
deeply religious, like themselves – that they often lacked in their countries of origin. 98 Lured in
by promises of community and happiness in an Islamic utopia, thousands of people crossed over
the Turkish border into the caliphate.
Once there, many individuals took up a variety of positions working for Daesh. Some
were fighters, others were mechanics, and still others helped with the bureaucracy of statebuilding and revenue collecting. Iraqis living in the territory Daesh took over, meanwhile, were
forcibly coerced into accepting Daesh’s message and performing Bay’ah [pledging their
allegiance] at the hands of al-Baghdadi.99 Life under the caliphate had some of the same
underpinnings for all, however: it was brutal, violent, and often painfully short. Citizens were
extorted for taxes and often threatened by gun-carrying combatants to offer goods and services
they had previous experience in providing. Those who did not immediately accept and welcome
Daesh were tortured or killed outright. The rest were forced to comply with the group’s demands
and live in fear. Women living under Daesh had to adhere to an increasingly strict moral code,
enforced by the al-Khansaa brigade – an all-female “moral police force” headquartered in
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Mosul.100 Additionally, women in the al-Khansaa brigade would often act as spies within Daesh,
sent into places throughout the caliphate to ensure everyone was acting as was morally
permissible. If women in Daesh territory were caught violating any of the established societal
rules, including simply leaving the house without a male chaperone, they would be subjected to
vicious (and often public) corporeal punishment. If men were caught talking to foreign parties,
they would be executed. 101
Ultimately, Daesh derived its legitimacy not from the goods and services it offered to
those under the caliphate, nor from the social media accounts that its members regularly utilized,
but from constant threat of violence. Al-Baghdadi knew that, in order for a “caliphate” to be
successful, it needed to take root in an already-weakened state. Iraq’s discontent and disarray
made it the perfect starting point for territorial expansion. Al-Baghdadi took advantage of the
sentiments of angry former Baathists and military officials, knowing that those individuals would
be the most likely to support a change away from the national government. He also knew they
were the only people who would have the skills and expertise needed to forcefully implement
that change. Al-Baghdadi dutifully filled them into the ranks of his quasi-government, paying
them both with money and with enslaved women captured from ethnic and religious minority
groups along the way. Al-Baghdadi engendered the idea of a religious utopia amongst foreign
populations through the utilization of propaganda, even encouraging unmarried Western women
to play a certain role in the “caliphate” as moral police. He governed through stringent and
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radical interpretations of religious texts, and the punishments meted out by his officers were as
frequent as they were violent. The legitimacy of Daesh’s “caliphate” was even more forced and
unnatural than the legitimacy of the federal governments of al-Maliki and Allawi.
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Chapter Three
The Fallout Post-Daesh
United States and Iraqi forces worked in tandem to eliminate Daesh’s territorial control
over Iraqi soil and citizens, but the struggle itself brought about a significant amount of damage.
Recognizing that they were likely fighting a losing battle, Daesh insurgents poisoned water
wells, damaged water-purification systems, and flooded large swaths of land as they retreated.
1

Daesh also deployed chemical weapons in heavily civilian-populated swathes of land while

fighting against anti-Daesh forces.2 Coalition forces seeking to push Daesh fighters out of the
cities they had claimed for themselves commenced large-scale bombings. The fact that much of
the fighting took place in densely populated cities, however, proved catastrophic. As was
explored in a 2017 report by the RAND Corporation, bombings often “highlight the limits of
precision firepower,”3 leaving innocent civilians caught in the crossfires. It appears this lesson is
still being learned. After a strategic bombing was carried out in 2019 by coalition forces on what
was assumed to be a Daesh stronghold (a Qanus Island, the Iraqi Counterterrorism Service and
its allies did not report a single casualty. 4
This led many to speculate that perhaps, in fact, coalition forces were acting on old
intelligence – that the island had been evacuated long before the bombing occurred, or that it was
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never the Daesh stronghold it was suspected to be in the first place.5 All of these proved to be
ongoing conflicts that coalition forces struggled with when defeating Daesh, their efforts towards
securing a nation free of influence from radical extremists hindered by the damage those same
efforts caused. Members of the Yazidi community – an ethnic and religious minority group
located primarily in the Nineveh Governorate – were arguably one of the populaces affected the
most. After Daesh’s 2014 genocidal attack on the Yazidis culminated in a siege on Mount Sinjar,
in which 2,000 Yazidis were brutally murdered and another 6,417 were captured and enslaved.6
The siege ensured that many survivors of the violence could no longer live in the region they
once knew to be home. Thousands remained enslaved despite the coalition’s best attempts at
liberation. Those still in captivity throughout liberation efforts were, on average, around 18 years
old,7 and they were sold into an elaborate system of sexual enslavement and forced marriages
that Daesh leadership organized. The few who have since managed to escape the aforesaid
system have shared stories of horrific trauma and tragedy with international authorities.8 The
survivors’ tales were haunting, yet had one common thread through all of them: each faced
extreme physical and sexual violence on a daily basis, and each was repeatedly told that the
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abuse they suffered post-siege and occupation was justified because they violated Daesh’s laws
simply by existing.9
The trauma the Yazidi community has endured since is devastating. Most of those who
escaped death, enslavement, and/or forced conscription were forcefully removed from their
homes as a result of Daesh’s 2014 siege.10 To this day, the vast majority are still displaced.11
Moreover, the Yazidis’ trauma is only further exacerbated by the rigidity of the community’s
religious and cultural beliefs. While community leaders broke decades-long tradition by
welcoming women who had been kidnapped by Daesh back into their community,12 that
acceptance came with a strong caveat. The women who had been sexually abused and forced to
give birth in captivity were not allowed to bring their children back home with them.13 These
mothers had to make a choice: leave those children behind completely, or never return home
again. Those who tried to bring their children back were shunned by their families and the
community at large – and those who made the tough decision to abandon their children were
forced to leave them in the care of strangers for the rest of their lives. 14
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The lasting effects that the war against Daesh had on the nation’s youths were not simply
limited to those cast out from their parents’ homes. In attempts to save young girls from being
married off to Daesh fighters – both during Daesh’s reign and during fighters’ subsequent retreat
– parents throughout Iraq instead arranged for marriages between their children and local older
men.15 These marriages were often violent, abusive, and psychologically scarring as well. 16
Children of displaced families throughout the nation also struggled greatly, and were found to
face high rates of sexual exploitation at the hands of the very aid workers, military personnel,
and IDP camp administrators stationed to help them. 17 Indeed, after the fighting between Daesh
and anti-Daesh forces displaced an additional one million Iraqi civilians, and forced countless
others to flee the country altogether to escape the violence 18, conditions only grew worse for
Iraqis trapped with nowhere else to go.
In her 2017 testimony at the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations’ hearing
entitled “The Future of Iraq’s Minorities: What’s Next After ISIS,” Dr. Denise Natali, the
former Director and Distinguished Research Fellow of the Center for Strategic Research at the
Institute for National Strategic Studies, declared that future prospects for Iraq’s ethnic and
religious minorities are all inextricably tied to the framework of Iraqi politics and group
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dynamics.19 Natali pointed to the worsening conditions in Iraq’s internally displaced persons
(henceforth “IDPs”) camps as evidence of her claim. As of late 2018, one full year after the
territorial “caliphate” had effectively been eradicated, a survey of 68,918 Iraqi IDPs spread
throughout seventy-two districts in sixteen governorates was conducted.20 Those surveyed were
asked about their intentions of movement within the next twelve months. Responses were split
into two central categories: those living outside of IDP camps, and those living inside IDP
camps. The disparities between the two groups became apparent upon analysis of the results.
Figs. 1 and 2 visually depict these results.
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The same survey also asked respondents to evaluate unmet humanitarian needs according
to their population group.21 These responses were divided into four different categories: IDPs
living outside of camps, returnees, non-displaced persons, and IDPs living inside of IDP camps.
The results illustrated not only how badly the nation was damaged by the ongoing crisis, but how
conditions inside IDP camps were the worst of all. Figs. 3, 4, 5 & 6 showcase the survey’s data.
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Fig. 5
Non-Displaced Persons Facing
Unmet Humanitarian Needs
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The ongoing crises experienced by IDPs in Iraq span multiple sectors. Their continued
displacement is further exacerbated, as 44% of IDPs in camps and 10% of IDPs out of camps
have never owned property documentation.22 This lack of documentation means that these IDPs
may never be able to return to the houses they once lived in – and, for the IDPs living in camps,
that they are prohibited from leaving camp grounds in the foreseeable future. 23 An additional
45,000 internally displaced children also lack birth certificates (or equivalent civil

“A Preliminary Assessment of Housing, Land and Property Right Issues Caused by the
Current Displacement Crisis in Iraq.” Geneva International Organization for Migration & the
United Nations, 2016.
http://iraqdtm.iom.int/LastDTMRound/IOM%20RWG%20SI%20Categorizing%20Protracted%2
0Displacement%20in%20Iraq_November%202018.pdf
23 REACH, MCNA VI.
22

36

documentation), meaning that they effectively ‘do not exist’ to the state. 24 Even more children
only possess birth certificates issued by Daesh, which Iraqi Security Forces may have
confiscated on suspicion of familial association with Daesh.25 Without proper documentation, all
of these youths cannot receive healthcare, education, and freedom of movement throughout Iraq
(should they or their families so choose).26 They are also at higher risk for detention at
governmental checkpoints throughout the nation. 27 The UNCHR has sought to rectify this
growing humanitarian issue, and has indeed provided assistance to about 23,000 Iraqi IDPs to
date28, but many still go without legal assistance.
A major contributing factor that has prevented IDPs from resettling effectively is the rise
of non-governmental militias throughout Iraq. Armed militias ran – and still, to this day,
continue to control29 – pockets within governorates. The militias in question often clash with one
another based on territorial disputes. Those disputes are taking on an insurgent-like quality in
and of themselves, protecting and promoting the interests of those aligned with respective
militias over the reunification of a war-wracked nation. Two particular hotbeds of violent militia
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activity are the territories of Kifri and Khurmatu. 30 Conflict in Kifri has raged as recently as late
2019. 31 Heated disputes between the Kurdish Peshmerga, Shia militias, and remaining Daesh
insurgents have led to Iraqis’ deaths. Further disputes stemming from the Kifri conflicts have led
to mobilization and attacks in Khurmatu, including the ambush of Shi’a paramilitary forces by
Daesh insurgents.32 Indeed, when surveyed by the United Nations’ IOM Migration Iraq
Mission’s Tracking Matrix, Iraqis addressed the infighting amongst and between militias as a
central reason as to why they remained displaced. 29% of the IDPs surveyed reported that, whilst
they very well may have been physically able to return to their homes, they and their family units
would nevertheless remain displaced due to the ongoing violence.33

Criminal Justice in the Post-Daesh Era
Amidst all of this, the federal government has sought to rectify the wrongs perpetuated by
Daesh forces on a public stage. The criminal justice system is the most apparent – and,
simultaneously, the most insidious – venue through which the government has elected to do so.
In 2016, watchdog organizations around the world started sounding the metaphorical alarm about
the federal government’s activities. 34 During a 2016 anti-Daesh raid in Fallujah, Iraqi forces
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utilized torture and extrajudicial killings in order to regain territorial control. 35 The government
made use of the same tactics in its raid on Mosul one year later, and some members of the antiDaesh coalition even posted seemingly-celebratory photos of dismembered corpses on their
social media accounts.36 At least one of these individuals was prosecuted by a foreign
government after the aforesaid individual sought in Sweden, with the Swedish courts ruling the
posts constituted a war crime. 37 Coalition members that have remained in Iraq, however, have
not faced prosecution or similar punishment. This is not to say, however, that the Iraqi
government has not prosecuted citizens in connection to the ongoing conflict; in fact, analyses
conducted by international human rights organizations suggest otherwise. Those receiving the
brunt of the punishment are those suspected of affiliation with Daesh.
While it is understandable that the government wants those “in league” with Daesh to
face atonement, reports suggest that the government may well be prosecuting innocent civilians
in the name of justice as well. In the contemporary criminal justice system, citizens can be
formally accused of aiding Daesh’s cause if two or more individuals accuse them.38 Evidence is
not inherently necessary – rather, the signatures of the accusers seem evidence enough for
security forces. International organizations have found that oftentimes, neighbors had proposed
adding individuals’ names to the lists of the accused based solely on personal grudges or land
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disputes.39 In the KRG, the process is similar. According to an email to a watchdog organization
from Dr. Dindar Zebari, chairman of the KRG’s High Committee to Evaluate International
Organizations’ Reports, accusers are simply required “to take an oath on the Quran to tell the
truth.40” The Iraqi federal government, meanwhile, requested that Iraqi security personnel
compile all of the names of the accused into one organized list for the centralized government to
maintain41 – so, even though the names on the aforesaid lists may simply be the result of
personal feuds, authorities have nevertheless detained individuals based on the accusations alone.
What about those for whom the accusations ring true? Many of those detained are
involved in cases a great deal more complicated than might be apparent upon first blush.
Thousands of civilians were conscripted and worked under Daesh. Many of those individuals
were nonviolent, never having harmed or killed another person. One judge, speaking to reporters
from Human Rights Watch, argued, “I had a case yesterday of an ISIS cook and I have
recommended giving him the death penalty. How could the ISIS fighter have executed someone
if he had not been fed a good meal the night before?42” Researchers from the United Nations
University also observed several trials in Tel Kayf and reported on what they had heard. One
case entailed an accountant who “worked for an office that distributed salaries to [Daesh]
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fighters […]” and was sentenced to life in prison. 43 Another involved an intellectually disabled
individual who had served as a warehouse guard for Daesh. Even after the man plead that his
brain tumor inhibited his cognition, he was both sentenced to death and told by the judge, “Of
course you are mentally ill. Daesh loves to recruit mentally ill people.”44 The wives of late Daesh
fighters have also been imprisoned under criminal law, despite the fact that they themselves did
not commit any crimes. They stood accused, and were ultimately convicted, of harboring
terrorist fugitives.45
The Iraqi Security Forces have long been accused of being responsible for thousands of
disappearances of Sunni men and boys throughout Daesh’s reign.46 Extrajudicial disappearances
and “enhanced interrogation tactics” have not stopped since, instead setting the stage for further
human rights abuses. Detention centers have held thousands of accused citizens for years at a
time, and the conditions in the aforesaid centers are often deplorable – detainees are subjected to
malnutrition, torture, and unsanitary and inhumane conditions, and are oftentimes forced to sign
confessions for crimes they vehemently argue that they did not commit. 47 Many of these
detainees are in desperate need of legal representation, as trials cannot occur or advance without
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an attorney present. It is often incredibly difficult to obtain such representation. The accused
often lack the funds necessary to hire a private attorney, so they must rely on state-appointed
lawyers. Even if detainees are able to scrounge up the money to afford private representation,
private lawyers have been incredibly selective about which cases they felt comfortable arguing.
Making matters even worse was the decision by Iraqi authorities to issue arrest warrants for
private lawyers representing the accused. 48 The charges on the warrants in question were of
suspected affiliation with Daesh, due to the attorneys’ work in court. 49 The resulting insecurity
and concern amongst private attorneys only worsened their selectivity – few would dare to take a
criminal case, lest they find themselves in need of legal representation later. Public defense
attorneys rose to the occasion after being appointed by the state. Nevertheless, public attorneys
were (and are to this day) often paid just twenty dollars per case, so they ultimately the lack
financial incentivization and/or in-depth knowledge of each case that is necessary to craft a
compelling argument.50
Further complicating sentencing is the nation’s disorganized and obfuscated judicial process.
The governing body of law on counterterrorism and criminal justice has changed in response to
Daesh’s crimes. In November of 2005, the Council of Ministers issued Law Number (13) for the
Year 2005, an Anti-Terrorism Law.51 According to Law Number (13), “any person who incites,
plans, finances, or assists terrorists to commit […] crimes […] shall face the same penalty as the
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main perpetrator. Anyone who intentionally covers up any terrorist act or harbors a terrorist with
the purpose of concealment shall be sentenced to life imprisonment. 52” It was under this law that
private defense attorneys were later arrested, and a climate of fear surrounded the task of
representing detainees. In 2016, Nouri al-Maliki’s government passed a series of amendments to
Iraqi criminal law that had offered amnesty for individuals who were civilian members of
Daesh.53 Those amendments were repealed just one year later, due to an outcry from certain
members of the National Assembly that too many loopholes existed within the amendments that
could enable perpetrators of violence to walk free.54 The abolishment also ensured that different
offenses were not treated and/or sentenced differently.55 Thus, those who were forced to serve as
guardsmen or civil service officers under Daesh’s burgeoning bureaucracy, by law, would face
the same punishments as those who directly engaged in kidnappings and decapitations. The law
still enables detainees to ask for retrials in the event that they were forced to sign an untrue
confession.56 Nevertheless, few (if any) instances of this have been recorded to date.
Additionally, a significant proportion of the testimony against accused detainees comes from
secret informants.57 Although their accounts often constitute the only shred of evidence against
the accused, these informants do not have to appear in court to testify and face the individual(s)
they have accused. While an argument can certainly be made about protecting the privacy of
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witnesses testifying against verified insurgents, the testimonies provided by secret informants in
many cases has the potential to do far more harm than good. The Central Criminal Court in
Baghdad has had to convict nearly 500 secret informants for providing false testimony over the
last few years alone. 58 The false testimony provided may have been fueled by personal vendettas,
misgivings about a person’s identity or associates, or even just the faulty recollection of an
eyewitness to unspeakable atrocities.
These biases cloud the capacity for the courts to have a fair trial – but they are not the only
likely instance of biases affecting criminal proceedings. Rather, many of the judges assigned to
Daesh cases have hailed from territories that were formerly oppressed by Daesh.59 This
knowledge has sparked concerns from the international community about clear conflicts of
interest, yet nothing has been done to resolve the issue. The judges in question are notorious for
“fifteen-minute trials” in which the accused do not actually get have their defenses heard and
taken into consideration. 60 All too often, the defendant pleads their case to an unaffected judge,
the defendant is prevented from speaking further after an initial explanation, the prosecution
promptly asks for a sentence, and the judge delivers the harshest possible sentence for whatever
the accused’s charges might be. 61 There is very little variance from this formula in spite of the
fact that thousands of these cases have gone before the courts over the last four years. One final
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part to the formula is reserved for those on death row: a reality television show called In the Grip
of the Law.
In the Grip of the Law
The Iraqi government has sponsored a satellite television news network since 2003. It
goes by the name of Al Iraqiya. 62 The station regularly airs news pieces deemed important to the
nation, be they government-sponsored messages or footage of raids against Daesh. One of the
pieces that was aired, for instance, displayed footage of the U.S. raid in Syria that killed Daesh
leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi – going so far as to show the explosion, as well as the aftermath of
the aforesaid explosion, that claimed al-Baghdadi’s life.63 Al-Iraqiya is not simply known for its
coverage of events such as these, however. One of the station’s most popular shows – if not the
premiere show in Iraqi television – is called, “In the Grip of the Law.” The program is meant to
air confessions of inmates waiting on death row to the rest of the nation. 64 In the words of the
show’s host, Ahmed Hassan, the program is meant to “spread awareness among citizens about
the importance of a life of peace and integrity, away from corruption and terrorism, so that man
can achieve major achievements through his faith in God, his loyalty to the country, and his
dedication to work.”65
The show’s mission and its methods of implementation, however, are arguably at odds
with one another. Broadcasts often depict grisly photographs and/or videos of the criminals’
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offenses, followed shortly thereafter by interviews with the criminals in the spot where they
committed their offense. 66 Ahmed Hassan conducts those interviews while the criminals are
kneeling in front of masked members of the Iraqi Security Forces, with several rifles aimed
directly at them.67 Many episodes involve the victims’ families appearing on screen, both to
mourn the victims and to tearfully berate and demand explanations from their loved ones’
killers.68 Dramatic music plays in the background throughout each episode, coming to a
crescendo whenever tears are shed. Cutscenes in sepia with security forces donning their
uniforms, grabbing firearms, and marching out to interviews’ locations are also a fairly common
on the show.69 For all intents and purposes, it seems as though In the Grip of the Law is far more
about entertainment than it is an actual chance at redemption or explanation for those on death
row.
This is not the first time Al Iraqiya has aired a television series designed to bring the
public a sense of closure for atrocities committed, however. In December 2011, three of alHashimi’s bodyguards were held at gunpoint and forced to confess their wrongdoings in front of
the nation’s watchful eye. 70 That series was entitled Terrorism in the Hands of Justice. In yet
another interesting case of U.S. interventionism, Terrorism in the Hands of Justice was created,
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financed, and widely distributed to the Iraqi public by the United States in 2005. 71 The first few
episodes aired right before the 2005 elections took place. Al Iraqiya aired the series twice a day
in the hopes that it would strengthen civilian support for the government, assuage concerns about
insurgents, and provide a source of entertainment for citizens – all while rallying the citizenry
around a common “enemy.” This legacy was continued with In the Grip of the Law.
With all of these positive goals being met, then, why have so many international
organizations come out against the television show? One of the reasons is that its mantra of
stabilization and security is predominantly performative in nature. “Performative security” may
roughly be defined as a tactic that is utilized by governments around the world – one designed to
make public spaces feel both open yet defendable from attacks.72 The consistent attacks from
insurgent groups – and the sociopolitical unrest that has defined the nation over the last
seventeen years and beyond – have contributed towards widespread feelings of insecurity in the
nation’s security apparatuses. Thus, the government’s perspective shifts in response from
ensuring public systems function properly to ensuring people feel safe to utilize and occupy
public spaces.73 Security is thereafter transformed into a different phenomenon altogether.
Indeed, performative security apparatuses have “become a key mechanism of risk management,
intended to colonize the future and reduce future insecurity.”74 The government cannot guarantee
its citizens lasting stability and peace – indeed, no government can – and so it must resort instead
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to performative measures to provide the illusion of safety. The Iraqi government spends roughly
$50 million annually on Al Iraqiya and the channels that fall under its umbrella alone. 75
Dedicating such significant funding to projects that do not actually aid the cause of obtaining
stability may very well cause more harm than good, especially in a nation where the financial
backing for vital needs and services is already lacking.
The substance of the programming must also be called into question. In the Grip of the
Law epitomizes the hero/detective genre: it forces wrongs to be made right, as the authoritative
Ahmed Hassan and the episodes’ arcs frequently suggest. While the answer as to whether Daesh
members deserve to be publicly shamed in such a manner is highly subjective, the show as it
exists today may very well violate the exposed prisoners’ human rights. In the Grip of the Law
“blurs the distinction between informational and entertainment programming,”76 and
automatically vilifies the convicted individuals who come on the show. There is an argument to
be made that being forced at gunpoint to recount one’s crimes in graphic detail, in front of the
vengeful gaze of an entire nation, is a punishment in and of itself. If such an argument is
assumed to be true, the Iraqi government has violated international law. According to the
Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, “No prisoner shall be punished except
in accordance with the terms of such law or regulation, and never twice for the same offense.”77
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Because the only prisoners that come on In the Grip of the Law are those already scheduled for
execution, appearance on this television show would indeed qualify as a second punishment.
Opponents of the aforesaid argument may argue that the television show does not (or
should not) qualify as a second punishment. However, the same code of conduct from the United
Nations goes on to affirm that, “When the prisoners are being removed to or from an institution
[death row, in this instance], they shall be exposed to public view as little as possible, and proper
safeguards shall be adopted to protect them from insult, curiosity, and publicity in any form.” 78
This assertion is the anthesis of In the Grip of the Law. At its most base level, then, it is clear to
see that these prisoners’ rights are being violated. While no psychological studies have been
done on this population to see how being on the television show affects them, many episodes do
feature convicted criminals breaking down in displays of intense emotion.79 Several episodes
have also featured the show’s host mocking prisoners after they state they had had no choice but
to follow Daesh’s orders. In one particularly striking episode, a prisoner states that Daesh
threatened to kill his family if he failed to follow through with a car bombing. Hassan cuts him
off, reiterating, “All of you say that. You weren’t trapped. Why didn’t you just walk away?” 80
This treatment is troubling, particularly as evidence suggests that many of the prisoners
paraded onto the television show might not even be those responsible for the atrocities
committed. Not only does this relate to the effectiveness (or lack thereof) of the overarching
criminal justice system, but also the editing and actions taken by the show. In one episode, a
prisoner by the name of Muwafaq Ahmed Shehab confessed to assisting his son in the systematic
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killing of civilians.81 Ahmed Hassan states that Shehab can be seen in the background of a video
of his son’s executions. When the video aired, however, the body and face of “Shehab” had been
completely blurred by the production team.82 This, of course, raises an important question: if
such damning evidence of Shehab’s guilt truly exists, why go to such lengths to obscure him
from view? The question becomes especially pressing when one considers that his unobscured
visage was already going to be broadcast on national television. Shehab’s case is not the only
example of this occurring. Many episodes that air lack any sort of photo or video evidence
linking the prisoners to the crimes – a particularly harrowing fact in the episodes that feature
convicted individuals denying they had any involvement with the crimes they then had to answer
for.
In the Grip of the Law might at first blush seem to be a good thing. It seems to unite
citizens regardless of sectarianism, class, and ethnicity. What’s more, it legitimizes and heroizes
the government and the ISF in a way that governance has always failed to do. Nevertheless, upon
taking a closer look, the true motivations underlying the program become apparent. Its sizable
financial backing has reallocated funds away from the myriad of real crises that could be solved
instead. Its style is purposefully sensationalistic, shoving facts aside in favor of blurred videos
and a calloused, dismissive interviewing style. Its very premise goes against codified
international law. In the Grip of the Law is successful for what it is: an exercise in performative
security and self-legitimization by the federal government. The good it actually does, though, is
questionable at best.
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Chapter Four
The Government & Hyper-Sectarianism
The Iraqi federal government has had a longstanding history of taking symbolic actions
to foster goodwill amongst the citizenry. Nevertheless, any semblance of tangible change has
ultimately remained inaccessible for countless Iraqis in need of aid.
1

One of the symbolic measures the government has taken in the post-Daesh era is the re-opening

of the nation’s Green Zone, a community in Baghdad to the west of Mansour. The Green Zone
has served as a home to “foreign embassies and key government buildings after the U.S.-led
invasion of 20003 and has since then been surrounded by blast walls and barbed wire,
inaccessible to most Iraqis.”2 The opening of the Green Zone was meant by the government to
seem as though it wants to close the gap between itself and its citizenry—bridging the distance
between the wants of those in power and the needs of the people. Yet that effort, while nice in
sentiment, did little to address the myriad of concrete issues plaguing Iraqi society.
Arguably, the closest that the government has come to bending to the will of the people
ever since is the resignation of Prime Minister Adel Abdul al-Mahdi. As a direct response to
ongoing protests by Iraqi civilians, Prime Minister al-Mahdi officially stepped down from his
office in early February, 2020.3 Mohammed Tawfiq Allawi, another Shi’a politician (and cousin
of former Prime Minister Ayad Allawi), has just taken over the office of the Prime Minister.4
While it certainly may seem like a positive sign to protestors that al-Maliki is no longer ruling,
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Allawi’s allegiances and connections in the political sphere may not ultimately differentiate him
much from his predecessor. 5 Allawi will have a great deal of rebuilding to do, however,
especially if he wishes to work towards overcoming the established quasi-tradition of hypersectarianism in Iraq—or make the lasting legacy of his time in office about more than simply
appeasing protestors and serving as a fresher face to a decades-old problem.
Over the last few years, Sunnis, Shi’as, and Kurds have become more divided than ever
before. Ever since Kurdistan was granted semi-autonomous status in the early 1970s—an
agreement codified into law in 2017—Kurds’ connections to Sunnis and Shi’as throughout the
rest of Iraq have grown strained.6 Territorial disputes between Kurdistan and the Iraqi federal
government over a multitude of cities still continue to rage on. 7 Shi’as have held strong majority
representation in the federal government since 2005, and effectively control the Popular
Mobilization Forces that work in tandem with the Iraqi Security Forces to police the nation. 8
Sunnis are those most disproportionally targeted by Iraqi Security Forces and the government as
potential Daesh sympathizers and collaborators, and Sunni communities are regularly subjected
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to heavy monitoring and suspicion.9 These national and sectarian divides have led to a great deal
of mistrust between Iraq’s three main groups—not to mention its smaller religious and ethnic
minorities—and has only been furthered by intense political competition between parties.
Sectarian conflict has led citizens to make drastic decisions. In an interview broadcasted on
Al Hurra News, a former Daesh member stated that his involvement in the group started because
Daesh had held a protest against al-Maliki’s leadership.10 The defector, whose face was
intentionally blurred so as to preserve anonymity, went by the pseudonym of Abu Hafsa. He
went on to explain that the reason he had joined Daesh was because he was tired of the
sectarianism that the al-Maliki government fostered. He had no idea of the group’s true
intentions until after he had joined, and even after learning about its objectives, had already been
cemented into the group as a security guard through the promises of stability, money and
marriage.11 Abu Hafsa is not the only Iraqi who had joined Daesh out of frustration with the
nation’s hyper-sectarian conflict. He reported that many other citizens who had attended the rally
against al-Maliki were lured in by the same promises. Indeed, Daesh is not the only foreign
influence attempting to take advantage of the divides within Iraq’s citizenry. Rather, “residents
of Iraq […] have been forced to choose between Sunnis and Shia in order to survive [… which]
prolonged the war, providing the time and space for belligerents in Iraq to weaponize
sectarianism.”12 Sectarianism has not simply been weaponized by the federal government to
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engender loyalty within citizens—it has been utilized as an effective weapon with which the
entire populace is under threat of succumbing to foreign influence.

National Security & Iraq: The Next Daesh
The climate in Iraq has grown so overwhelmingly sectarian and hostile that experts are
concerned extremism may rise again. The decentralization of Daesh means that offshoots of the
organization might begin to promulgate in neighboring countries, similar to Al Qaeda’s
architecture.13 The group’s loss of a territorial caliphate does not inherently mean their ideology
has lost its credence—in fact, theorists have even posited that the organization has been aiming
to “return to its roots as an insurgency and virtual caliphate with global ambitions and terrorist
capabilities”14 for years. Kurdish intelligence reports that Daesh has reformed, and the group “no
longer wants to control any territory to avoid being a target. Instead […] the extremists have
gone underground.”15 This first option may not necessarily pose an immediate threat to Iraq, but
the continual radicalization of struggling populations throughout the MENA region will
eventually pose a far-reaching, long-term sociopolitical crisis on a similar scale to that of 2014.
Iraq’s hyper-sectarian tensions will also sway insurgents’ approach towards radicalizing new
members, as well. Current protests are belying what may very well shape up to be a geopolitical
crisis of its own, as Sunnis in Iraq have endured deprivation, disillusionment, and
disenfranchisement at the hands of the Shi’a-led government for years. If Allawi does not reverse
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the course of precedent on these issues, the nation as a whole may be wracked apart by the
ensuing struggles.
The loss of the territorial caliphate in Iraq may also mean that Daesh operatives who have
evaded capture and are still allegiant to the cause might join forces with other insurgency groups.
During the Syrian civil war, Daesh fought alongside the Free Syrian Army, another ideological
extremist organization with which it had previously had highly public disagreements. 16 AlBaghdadi even claimed to have merged Daesh with the al-Nusra Front—a move which, three
months later, incurred the anger of al-Nusra leadership, as they claimed they had not agreed to
such a marriage between organizations.17 Nevertheless, during those three months, Daesh
successfully procured weapons and intelligence from governments who automatically assumed
Baghdadi’s truthfulness. This was allegedly the case with Turkey and Daesh with regards to the
Syrian civil war. The leader of Turkey’s Republican People’s Party publicly released a document
from the Adana Office of the Prosecutor that claims Turkey regularly supplied insurgency
groups fighting in Syria with weapons.18 Furthermore, a leaked order issued by the Turkish
Minister of the Interior stressed that, “It is important to comply with the security and
confidentiality of the issue by providing the necessary support to the intelligence officers in the
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passage of the mujahideen affiliated with al-Nusra […] from our country borders to Syria.”19 The
Turkish government provided assistance and aid to Daesh and its affiliates in the al-Nusra Front
because it saw the Assad regime in Syria as the bigger threat. If another war breaks out, world
powers might be tempted to do the same and arm the “lesser evil” in the struggle. Daesh would
not have to return the artillery it has received, however—indeed, there is no evidence to suggest
that they would consider returning the weaponry even if they were ordered to by a foreign
government—and arming a highly-motivated insurgency could very well prove problematic in
the future.
Daesh’s “successes” (and the subsequent martyrdom of its caliphate) may also inspire socalled lone wolves radicalized by continued abuse and mistreatment to carry out attacks of their
own. Imperiled Iraqis may start considering the views of insurgents as valid for any number of
reasons. Be it years of Sunni disenfranchisement,20 the detainment and deaths of families at the
hands of the Iraqi Security Forces,21 watching loved ones be humiliated and berated on national
television for crimes they did not commit,22 anger at the injustices and corruption present within
one’s own government,23 the horrific conditions and instances of sexual abuse within IDP
camps,24 or another reason entirely, countless Iraqis have been deeply, personally affected by the

“MIT Hosted ISIL Under the Orders of Muammer Guler.” Radikal News, June 13, 2014.
http://www.radikal.com.tr/politika/mit-isidi-muammer-gulerin-emriyle-agirladi-1196924/
20 Sly, Liz. “ISIS: A Catastrophe for Sunnis.” The Washington Post, November 23, 2016.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/world/2016/11/23/isis-a-catastrophe-forsunnis/?utm_term=.54eab4e7b0c9
21 Taub. “Iraq’s Post-ISIS Campaign of Revenge.”
22 “ISIS Captives Get Publicly Shamed on Iraqi Reality Show.” WSJ, December 12, 2014.
Video. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=w-UAxDw0_O0
23 Daesh: Escaping Hell. “Abu Hafsa: What I Learned at ISIS University.” Episode Seven.
Directed by Ali Mula. Written by Ali Mula & Mike Tucker. Al Hurra Network, August 12, 2017.
24 Sathyanarayanan, Sunethra. “Iraq Country Overview: A report on the Scale, Scope, and
Context of the Sexual Exploitation of Children.” End Child Prostitution and Trafficking, March,
19

56

turmoil of the last few years. Those with internet access may very well come across Daesh
propaganda specifically targeted to their struggle. They may wind up in a conversation with a
member of an insurgency group who seems empathetic and understanding. They might simply
recall the effectiveness that Daesh once had with utilizing violence to affect change in the nation.
People do not need to swear allegiance to an insurgency organization to cause harm, and
individuals looking to carry out an attack might find that little planning and expertise is needed
to wreak havoc. Lone wolves do not have to worry about coordinating with larger entities or
other individuals, making their plans dependent entirely on their willpower and physical
capabilities. This means that oftentimes, lone wolf operators often go unnoticed and undetected
until it is too late. Indeed, in 2016 alone, lone wolf operatives inspired by Daesh “carried out
more than 1,100 attacks worldwide that claimed more than 9,000 lives, the bulk of them in
Iraq.”25 The government must seek to rectify the tragic wrongs of the last few years, putting its
efforts into connecting with the public instead of relying on forced claims of legitimacy. If the
government does not change tactics soon, the stability of the nation will undoubtedly be at risk.

Protests at the Time of Writing
Since September of 2019,26 hundreds of thousands of men, women, and children have
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gathered in the streets of Iraq to publicly protest years upon years’ worth of grievances.
Protestors have turned out in waves to express their discontent with government corruption,
mistrust in the criminal justice system and the Iraqi Security Forces, frustration at the hypersectarian nature of the government (and Iraqi society as a whole), and desperation at the
complete and total lack of public goods and services available. 27 As of December 3, 2019, more
than 400 people died and over 19,000 people were injured as a direct result of the protests. 28 The
government did begin to release reforms addressing much of the aforesaid concerns once the
protests started, yet the government’s sudden decision to tackle these issues is “often perceived
as unrealistic or ‘too little, too late.’”29 The seemingly disingenuine nature of the government’s
newly rolled-out solutions has further alienated the populace from the government.
The first pressing issue that the government has sought to address is that of
corruption within the government. The protests first commenced when Prime Minister al-Mahdi
demoted Lieutenant General Abdul-Wahab al-Saadi, commander of Iraq’s counter-terrorism
forces, without offering any sort of clarification as to why.30 Al-Saadi was particularly popular
amongst Iraqis for his vehement defense against Daesh, both as a strategic leader and as an
active fighter himself. 31 Al-Saadi’s demotion was answered by public outrage on social media
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and in the streets.32 This appeared to be yet another display in an ongoing pattern of
governmental inefficacy: grossly negligent or sectarian actions were taken, and leading officials
did not bother to issue any form of explanation as to why the aforesaid events transpired. Worse
still, when Iraqi citizens began protesting al-Saadi’s removal from office, the full might of the
Iraqi Security Forces met them head-on. Protests throughout the country received similar
treatment regardless of the demographic of those protesting. High school students in Basra, for
instance, were met with “tear gas cannons […] and live bullets.” 33 A Baghdad man interviewed
by international journalists encapsulated the public’s disillusionment with the state of the
government in his declaration that, “Burning [Iraqi] army trucks won’t help us, it will only help
the government accuse us of being hooligans.” 34 This sentiment, while bleak, may not be far off
from the truth. The Iraqi military itself recently admitted in a statement that, “Excessive force
outside the rules of engagement was used and we have begun to hold accountable those
commanding officers who carried out these wrong acts.”35
Al-Saadi’s demotion marked the first alleged abuse of power by the Iraqi government in
September, but it was not the last. The nation’s Communications and Media Committee placed a
three-month suspension on the regional headquarters of Al Hurra television.36 Al Hurra, funded
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by the US Agency for Global Media, has been accused by the federal government “of bias and
defamation […] after it aired a documentary alleging corruption within the country’s religious
institutions.”37 The documentary in question also strongly implied that there was reason to
suspect improper connections between members of leading Iraqi political parties, governmental
agencies, and armed militia groups.38 Al Hurra’s other programming was similarly contrarian to
the state-funded television shows of Al Iraqiya, including offerings such as Daesh: Exiting Hell,
a television show that conducted in-person interviews with Daesh defectors and fully humanized
each former member. Some watchdog organizations have declared that the news of the
government’s shutdown of Al Hurra is quasi-authoritarian in nature. The Press Freedom
Advocacy Association in Iraq has issued an uncategorical condemnation of the government’s
shutdown of Al Hurra, reporting that “the Media and Communications Committee [is] in
violation of Law 65, which does not allow the government to close or revoke the license of any
media outlet without a judicial order.”39 A secondary violation of Law 65 is that periods of
suspension must not extend for longer than thirty days at a time. 40
Protestors cited examples of government corruption with regards to matters of foreign
policy, as well – the Iraqi government has long been caught between the influence of Iran and the
influence of the United States. Citizens have expressed discomfort at how closely the Iraqi
government has relied on its Iranian allies, particularly as Iran is proven to have financially and

Ibid.
38 “Iraq Suspends U.S.-Funded Broadcaster Al-Hurra Over Corruption Report.” Committee to
Protect Journalists, September 3, 2019. https://www.iraqinews.com/baghdad-politics/iraqsuspends-us-funded-tv-channel-over-corruption-documentary-at-religious-institutions/
39“ اشهر3  ”هيئة االعالم واالتصاالت تعلق عمل مكتب الحرة عراقThe Press Freedom Advocacy Association
in Iraq, September 2, 2019. https://pfaa-iq.com/?p=3172
40 Ibid.
37

60

materially supported the Shi’a militias comprising the Popular Mobilization Forces. 41 Others
have professed their annoyance at the U.S.’ continual interventionism, arguing that Iraqi
governance would likely not have been the way it has for the last two decades were it not for the
U.S.’ authority.42 Anger against the undue influence from both of the aforementioned nations
has, subsequently, led to the escalation of protests. Both the American and Iranian embassies in
Baghdad’s Green Zone were subjected to substantial violence over the course of just a few
weeks. The American embassy was graffitied, imperiled by rocket fire, and desecrated by
flaming battering rams utilized to break through windows and damage doors.43 The Iranian
consulate, meanwhile, was burned down in its entirety in the second arson attempt within a onemonth timeframe.44 As a direct response to these attacks, the government of Iraq subsequently
imposed a curfew upon the citizenry. 45 Seven unnamed ministers also attempted to resign from
their positions in order to assuage the rapidly-escalating public protests, but Prime Minister alMahdi rejected their resignations outright. 46 Al-Mahdi himself resigned in February 2020 in
response to the ever-worsening political climate, ceding his position to Mohammed Tawfiq
Allawi.47
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Mohammed Tawfiq Allawi’s ascendance to power is off to a somewhat shaky start
already. Protestors have already made it clear that they see Allawi as a figurehead for a
longstanding corrupt government, as many demonstrations now feature photos of Allawi with his
face crossed out in red paint. 48 Allawi has taken note of the way that protestors perceive him,
stating in his first public address that “he vowed to refuse his nomination for the prime minister
post if any political blocs try to dictate the selection of ministers in his government… [and that]
his criteria for a minister is to be qualified by the virtue of his or her integrity and competence,
not […] political party.”49 Yet Allawi still faces contention from some of the most powerful
blocs in the National Assembly, and some skeptics remain worried that his promises for reform
will not actually bear long-lasting positive changes.50 The many failed iterations of the previous
forms of the Iraqi “republic” have left a great many members of the citizenry overly skeptical of
future governance.
The singular, major instance of Iraqis overcoming hyper-sectarianism in recent history is
with the ongoing protests. Kurds, Shi’as and Sunnis have come together to fight against rampant
corruption, a lack of direction on vital public services, and the state’s relative inability to allocate
oil revenue funds appropriately and successfully. 51 While Iraq expected to receive “$79 billion in
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oil money based on projected reports of 3.88 million barrels per day at a price of $56 a barrel,” 52
the money in question does not often go to alleviating the ongoing crises countless Iraqis face in
contemporary times. Instead, a significant proportion of the nation’s public sector spending is
with its state-owned enterprises. These enterprises “are largely unprofitable and depend on soft
loans from state-owned banks and special grants from the government budget in order to cover
essential spending, including salaries.” 53 Worse still, previous efforts by the World Bank to
reform public spending habits have failed. In a 2015 evaluation of the nation after years of work
by the World Bank, an independent committee found Iraq’s financial landscape was still largely
inadequate.54 The report explained that this might be because “ownership of the reforms is the
prerequisite of any progress in the execution and oversight of any public financial reform
program. If you don’t have key reformers in the government and an identified constituency
supporting the reform agenda […] there is a risk that public financial reform programs will not
be initiated and achieved.”55 Unless major financial reforms are made within the bureaucracy of
the government – and, indeed, it does not seem likely that this shall be happening any time soon
– the needs of hundreds of thousands of people will continue to remain unaddressed, growing
more and more dire by the second.
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Regarding Semi-Autonomous Regions: Kurdistan
While unrest has plagued a great deal of Iraqi society, citizens in Kurdistan have, as a
whole, had far fewer qualms with how the Kurdish Regional Government (henceforth “KRG”)
has operated in recent years. The KRG has taken expansive measures to control law and order in
its portion of Iraqi society, yet Kurds have generally responded well to their government’s needs
and requests because of the close nationalistic and patriotic ties they feel to their government. As
such, when Kurdistan is analyzed in relation to Iraq as a whole, the former is generally
considered to be more stable.56 Studies have also shown that, when compared to Iraq, Kurdistan
has greater respect for civil rights, as well as individual and political rights. 57 These findings are
far from groundbreaking; cross-cultural studies spanning decades have suggested as much. One
of the primary factors that must be considered when considering decentralization is that of socalled “horizontal inequalities,” or inequalities amongst and between different groups of people.
In a comprehensive study utilizing a “large-N statistical analysis of thirty countries around the
world from 1985 to 2000,” 58 it was proven that political decentralization often decreases interethnic conflict and sectarianism. Another study, specifically assessing the constitutional republic
of Indonesia, found that the process of decentralizing the Indonesian government has “relieved
center-periphery tensions around long-standing grievances towards nationalist agendas […] and
addressed long-standing inter-group tensions and horizontal inequalities at the local level.”59 The
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semi-autonomous region of Kurdistan, an example of decentralized governance in Iraq, has done
similarly well for itself.
During the conflict with Daesh – as well as the Syrian civil war – internally displaced
Iraqis and Syrian refugees alike often flocked to Kurdistan. 60 These conflicts led to the growth of
the population of Kurdistan by 28% in just a few months.61 In order to properly accommodate
the large influx of residents in the region, the KRG sought to provide equal opportunities to both
Kurds and its new populaces starting at the most basic level possible. One of the ways in which
they sought to accomplish this was through providing education to all. Studies have found that
offering an education to traumatized populations can mitigate a variety of factors that would
have otherwise likely endangered their lives.62 Education has been found to weaken ethnocommunal violence, as well as reduce horizontal inequalities such as unemployment and child
mortality, even when controlling for age, culture and nation of origin. 63 It was necessary, then,
for Kurdistan to succeed in this endeavor. Several things helped them achieve their goal: the
opening of IDP schools by the KRG,64 an intersectional system of linguistics and sociocultural
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diversity that prioritizes peace,65 and the assistance of international NGOs like UNESCO.66 Od
course, this is not to say that education in Kurdistan has been perfect – after all, individual
instances of discrimination based on nationality, religion, and/or language spoken still occur in
many IDP schools throughout the Kurdish region of Iraq.67 Nevertheless, the KRG’s decision to
implement a baseline educational curriculum for populations in crisis is, if nothing else, a strong
start towards reducing ethnosectarian conflict as a whole.
Kurdistan has also proven its prowess within its interactions with the Iraqi federal
government. The KRG still works closely with the Iraqi government on a variety of issues,
including its decision to sell Kurdish oil through the Iraqi State Oil Marketing Company.68 The
KRG still maintains a great deal of internal autonomy, however. The KRG has successfully
drafted a unique body of legislation,69 created its own government (including a parliament, a
prime minister, and a president),70 and has successfully maintained its centuries-old distinct
cultural traditions as well. 71 Data aggregated by the Transparency International Corruption
Perceptions Index, the World Bank Business Enterprise Survey, and the Global Corruption
Barometer has also shown that “corruption is less widespread in the KRI than in Iraq as a whole
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[…and] reported rates of bribery are lower in the KRI compared to other regions of Iraq.” 72
Though it still remains a part of Iraq, and indeed, operates within the framework of the Iraqi
Constitution at all times,73 Kurdistan as an autonomous entity has still procured a great deal of
international recognition and respect. Although it certainly still has its problems, as well, the
Kurds within the governorates of Duhok, Erbil, Sulaymaniyah and Halabja generally perceive
the government as legitimate.74 Because of this, the KRG exists in a cycle wherein 1) the
Kurdish public recognizes the government as legitimate, 2) the government is better able to
affect important change when necessary because of public support stemming from the aforesaid
legitimacy, so 3) the perception of legitimacy is henceforth strengthened.

Regarding Semi-Autonomous Regions: Basra
Kurdistan achieved its semi-autonomous status largely by way of force. The KRG’s
Peshmerga took control of most disputed territories when Daesh invaded in 2014. 75 Kurdistan’s
more physically assertive roots prove to be dramatically different than those of another region
that has been arguing for its own semi-autonomous status for over a decade: Basra. The bid for
autonomy in Basra has gained traction since 2005, in no small part due to the Iraqi Constitution’s
provisions allowing for semi-autonomous regions’ existence. Indeed, the Constitution has
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established “a Federation Council to include representatives from the regions and the
governorates that are not organized in a region […]” to serve as a regulatory body for semiautonomous regions.76 This Council, which would have also facilitated proceedings for granting
semi-autonomous status to interested parties, 77 was ultimately never formed. A separate process
to ratify and support semi-autonomous regions is, however, laid out in the nation’s
Constitution.78 According to officials, the government “a region would be formed by a
referendum by […] a request presented by [one] third of the members of each of the governorate
councils, formed according to wishing to form a region, [or] a request presented by one tenth of
the voters in each governorate of the governorates wishing to form a region.” 79 It is this process
that underlies much of Basra’s contemporary efforts for semi-independence.
Basra is the southernmost governorate in Iraq – and is a center not only for trade, but oil
reserves.80 Basra is estimated by some to account for about 80% of Iraq’s total oil extracts.81
Basra’s bid for autonomy began in the 1920s, when the region was under British control.82 Their
bid ultimately failed, yet those within the region never fully gave up their attempts towards
securing a stable, semi-autonomous region of their own. The call for independence post-2003
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was first taken up by Basra’s governor, Wa’il ‘Abd al-Latif.83 Al-Latif and his successor pushed
for a greater degree of independence for Basra from Baghdad, and to a certain extent, each was
successful in small measures.84 The movements for independence for Basra stemmed from the
region’s concerns regarding a fair distribution of revenue from the oil reserves – since Basra was
responsible for a significant propoertion of Iraq’s oil extracts, many in Basra felt they were owed
a better share of the profits than they had been receiving.85 Not only did those in Basra not
receive the share of the profits they had wanted, but they also failed to rally the votes necessary
to successfully drum up a petition for autonomy.86 Al-Latif argued that the end results of the vote
were not simply because Basra citizens did not want independence, but instead because of illegal
interventions to hamper the autonomy project […] including bribery, pressure, and even the
issuing of fatwas that said that anyone who supported Basra’s bid was sacrilegious.” 87 In 2011,
another attempt at autonomy was made: a referendum was signed by one third of the
governorate’s council members. 88 Nevertheless, this bid was subsequently ignored by the federal
government.89
While Basra’s bid for autonomy might have fallen by the wayside, citizens of the
governorate were nonetheless active in politics. When the Iraqi federal government made a deal
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with Shell for over $17 billion in 2012, hundreds of protestors rallied in the streets, arguing that
they had unjustly been excluded from the agreement. 90 These protests received national attention,
and the leadership in Basra was eventually able to pressure the government into passing Law
21.91 This law enabled for individual governorates to have more of a say in their administrative
and economic proceedings. 92 Ever since those proceedings, support for an autonomous Basra
skyrocketed. A survey conducted by the International Republican Institute in 2012 reported that,
when asked “Would you prefer that the provincial councils or the federal government have more
authority?”, 96% of respondents in Basra responded that they would prefer provincial
authority.93 What’s more – 0% of those in Basra preferred federal authority over provincial
authority.94
Interestingly enough, when the leader of the Iraqi government shifted from al-Maliki to
al-Abadi, the federal government became much more open to considering petitions for
autonomy.95 In 2014, al-Abadi expressed that the government was “with Basra and its people,
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and we want them to flourish […] it is a resourceful and pioneering governorate in terms of
decentralization while maintaining the unity of Iraq.” 96 One year after his visit, Abadi reaffirmed
that he believed granting Basra semi-autonomous status (and enabling an easier process for
regions’ decentralized autonomy) would “enhance Iraq’s national unity by giving people a
greater say in running their day-to-day decisions.”97 Yet another petition for semi-autonomous
status was filed, but it still needed signatures from roughly 7% of voters before the federal
government could hold a referendum on the matter. 98 The federal government would be
responsible for gathering the signatures needed, and they still have not done so. 99 The
government did grant one major victory for financial independence in 2015, however, when it
split the South Oil Company into the Dhi Qar Company and the Basra Oil Company. 100 The
Basra Oil Company was a way for Basra to gain a proportion of the funds from its oil revenue
back into the governorate, and it has indeed achieved its goal in this matter. A significant amount
of the revenue from Basra’s oil exports still goes directly to the federal government of Iraq, but
Basra has gained some control over its finances and trade administration.
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The regional government in Basra is, indeed, perceived as legitimate by its citizenry –
and, as such, it is able to secure economic benefits for its people. Despite the federal
government’s insistence upon shutting down petitions for regional autonomy, both the
government and its constituents alike have worked hard to ensure their voices are heard on the
matter of semi-autonomy. If the federal government does choose to consider Basra’s decadeslong pleas for a greater degree of financial and political freedom, such a move may also go a
long way in improving past tensions between the people of Basra and the federal government.
Indeed, it may even pave the way for a fruitful partnership between the governments, just as the
KRG and the Iraqi federal government currently have.
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In Conclusion
The consistent struggle for legitimacy that the Iraqi government has faced ever since
2003 has wound up impacting each iteration of the government’s rule. The country has long
suffered from government corruption, run-down infrastructure, and a critical shortage of public
goods and services when Iraqis have needed them most.1 The ongoing IDP crisis, which has left
over 500,000 IDPs struggling to re-find a sense of normalcy amidst the chaos – worsened by the
fact that the Iraqi government treats many women and children as criminals, because the women
in question were forced to marry Daesh fighters – still has no viable solution in sight. Worse still,
many of these women and children only possess documentation as distributed under Daesh rule. 2
The federal government refuses to recognize these papers as legitimate, and the Iraqi Security
Forces have even confiscated many of these papers outright. This not only means that countless
Iraqis will not be able to return to the homes they once had, but it also effectively leaves them
stateless. They often cannot return to the homes or governorates that they once lived in – and, for
the IDPs living in camps, that they are prohibited from leaving camp grounds in the foreseeable
future.3 An additional 44% of IDPs in camps do not (and indeed, have never had to) own
property documentation.4 All of these individuals struggle greatly in their daily lives, as the Iraqi
government has failed to provide basic goods and services to sustain their lives. The nation as a
whole lacks a critical structure for water, hygiene, food, shelter, and healthcare – and these
conditions are only exacerbated further in the camps.5 People in IDP camps are also at higher
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risk for detention at governmental checkpoints throughout the nation,6 which means that they
very well could be put through the newly-rigid and almost-authoritarian criminal justice system
in the post-Daesh era.
The political system in Iraq has an established history perforated with abuses of power at
every level.7 When specifically considering post-Baathist regimes, these abuses can even be seen
in the first Interim Government in 2003. In Ayad Allawi’s government, the General Security
Directorate served as an effective iron fist. 8 Allawi instituted a mandatory curfew for citizens,
and encouraged members of his General Security Directorate to search citizens’ homes
unannounced as often as they wanted. 9 Many of these officials were leaders in Saddam
Hussein’s government – former Baathists, and calculated military professionals – and would
inspire fear in the hearts of citizens, many of whom were terrified that they would be detained at
any time. Allawi himself was even alleged by many witnesses to have executed six suspected
Daesh members in the back of the head, execution-style, at a police station. 10 The goal was to
show security forces “how to behave.” 11 Allawi’s decision to create the Higher Media Council, a
propaganda arm of the regime that censored any and all critiques of the government, 12 further
alienated the populace.
The government that followed was just as authoritarian, if not more so. Prime Minister
Al-Maliki was also regularly accused of targeting and imprisoning journalists for speaking out
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against him.13 Rather than do anything to rectify the wrongs of Allawi’s regime, Al-Maliki
carried on Allawi’s legacy. He started to censor sectarian violence and conflict in the media,
which escalated into banning any and all violent or sexual content. 14 He proceeded by censoring
anything that might discuss negative remarks about Islam, acts of terrorism, and vices such as
gambling.15 Most of the airtime on television was dedicated to supporting the al-Maliki regime.
The public grew particularly mistrustful of the government, as the constant support in the media
reminded many of the Baathist regime in 2002. These worries surrounding quasiauthoritarianism were only further exacerbated by the administration’s decision to fire those
whose positions were explicitly created to fight corruption,16 its choice to create two military
forces that reported straight to al-Maliki,17 and his campaign on banning over four hundred and
fifty people running for office that were planning on running against him. 18 He even accused his
Vice President of engaging in terrorist activities, and while that particular move proved effective
at garnering him some public support, many (including the former Vice President himself) saw
the move for what it was: a strategy to consolidate power.19
Haider al-Abadi’s government came afterwards but was almost immediately undermined
by Daesh’s siege on Iraq. For three years, Daesh held control over a significant amount of
territory in Iraq and Syria. 20 This territory included prominent oil fields.21 Daesh funded itself
through a myriad of illegal activities, including reselling stolen cultural artifacts and human
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trafficking.22 Daesh issued its own propaganda magazine, arguing that Muslims from around the
world should join Daesh in supporting and defending its territorial “caliphate.” Their online
outreach was effective, getting them thousands of sympathizers and future fighters. 23 Daesh
knew how to prey on those who were lonely, lost, and seeking belonging and empowerment.
When those people entered the territorial caliphate, however, many would soon find that life
under Daesh was nothing short of miserable. Between extortion for taxes, constant threats of
death from angering Daesh combatants, and the fear of being reported as subversive by spies
from the al-Khansaa bridage,24 those under Daesh’s rule either lived in fear of meeting a violent
end, were tortured, or were brutally executed.25
The contemporary criminal justice system, somehow, is arguably worse than its
predecessors. An innumerable amount of people have been arrested under suspicion of
collaborating with Daesh, yet the evidence against them is weak. A significant proportion of the
testimony against accused detainees comes from secret informants, but over 500 were arrested in
just the last few years for providing false information. 26 Virtually all of those accused of
working with Daesh are convicted after five-minute trials, 27 conducted by judges whose families
lived in Daesh-controlled territories. 28 Even those who were forced to serve Daesh in a civilian
capacity – as chefs, automobile mechanics, or warehouse guards – faced execution for their
“unforgivable crimes.”29 The Iraqi Security Forces also committed a series of extrajudicial
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kidnappings throughout Daesh’s reign, as well as after its end. 30 Many of the men and boys
kidnapped were held in dilapidated detention centers for years on end, surviving in spite of
deplorable living conditions.31 Those who are able to secure legal representation for themselves
can really only do so through court-appointed lawyers, as private attorneys have been imprisoned
and jailed for trying to take on cases they believed in.3233 Many of those convicted were forced
onto the state-funded television program In the Grip of the Law, a dramatic and performative
show in which those arrested were confronted by the families of their alleged victims, 34 berated
in front of a firing squad, 35 and forced to agree that they deserved to die for the crimes they had
committed.36 Not only is the television show a blatant grab at legitimacy on the part of the Iraqi
government, but it is also a significant waste of government funding. $50 million annually goes
to In the Grip of the Law and its fellow programs on Al Iraqiya, while basic public goods and
services have yet to be offered to the public. 37
All of these iterations of government, politics, and criminal justice have ultimately
contributed to an oft-antagonistic relationship (or, at best, an apathetic coexistence) between the
government and its citizens. Ongoing anti-government protests have demonstrated as much;
some protestors are even calling for the eradication of the current government and the instilment
of a different political system altogether. 38 Iraq is seeking to rebuild itself, yet it continues to face
the same pressing issues it has for over a decade now. This is because, perhaps, the government
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has focused its strategies on forcing the public’s love and respect through fear, authoritarian
control, and corrupt policies. Rather than working on building a strong relationship with its
citizenry, as have the governments in Kurdistan and Basra, the Iraqi federal government has
instead alienated its populace by demonstrating, time and time again, that it does not trust them.
it is clear that reform must occur, but before any such successes might happen, the government
must first focus on providing its citizens with what they so crucially need rather than funding
methods of performative security.
Plenty of possible solutions for the crisis may exist, but one thing is certain: because the
government of Iraq has always lacked legitimacy in the eyes of its citizens, the path forward will
likely favor a more decentralized approach to governing than ever before. Giving local
governorates a greater degree of autonomy has not only improved citizens’ relationships with
their regional governments, but with the federal government as well. Such a decision can also
negatively impact radicalization efforts by insurgency groups. In an interview with a former
Daesh member, he explains that many of the people from al-Anbar who wound up joining Daesh
did so only because Daesh promised them a peaceful, semi-autonomous, self-governed region
“like Kurdistan.”39 This idea of semi-autonomy was so powerful that it was, quite literally, the
reason that many people joined Daesh in the first place. It will also ensure that the federal
government can reallocate its resources in a more appropriate fashion, doing whatever it can to
aid its struggling citizenry rather than to oppress it further. The Iraqi people do not need “bread
and circuses,” so to speak, to find legitimacy in their government. They need a government that
will listen to them, take their considerations and needs into account, move beyond the hyper-
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sectarian wave that has taken control of the nation, and work for the good of all. In short, they
need a system of government that they can trust has their best interests at heart. Until and unless
they get that, the nation may very well continue to tear itself apart under the weight of its own
history and past transgressions.
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